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EUTHANASIA IN THE HADAMAR SANATORIUM
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Maximilian Koessler
The author (Editorial Department, Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco) is an
Austrian Jur. D., member of the Vienna Bar until 1938 and of the New York Bar
since 1946. The present article is part of a Ph.D. dissertation (Columbia University).
The views expressed therein are personal to the writer, and not necessarily those
of the official organizations to which he belonged in his successive capacities as
Attorney of the War Crimes Group of the U.S. Army in Germany (194647), of
the Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes in Nurnberg (194748) and of
the Legal Division of the Military Government for Bavaria (194849).--EDIToR.
I. INTRODUCTION
The World War II war crimes trials were first hailed as indication
of great progress in the field of international law. Those who criticized
them because of their shortcomings, real and alleged, were then a
small minority in the victor countries. Meanwhile, the pendulum has
swung in the opposite direction. Even writers of undeniable good faith
and competence are indulging in one-sided appraisals of those trials,
emphasizing their weak spots and ignoring or minimizing their merits.1
We are not yet at sufficient distance from those historic developments
to be able to pass a final judgment as to their value respecting the en-
forcement of international law.2 They are, however, a fascinating
topic for study, both as a matter of history and of law. Only a policy
of the ostrich could suggest neglect of this fertile field of research.
The present paper is an attempt to analyze one of the most remark-
able among the "non-Nuremberg" war crimes trials in Germany.3 It
is the only one of which the original transcript has been published ver-
batim.4 Discussion of the Hadamar Trial will establish a liaison with
pertinent evidence appearing from the records of related Nuremberg
trials.
Before entering upon the subject-matter proper, a few words should
be said about the origin of this case which is officially designated as
United States v. Alfons Klein et al.5 Hadamar was occupied by Ameri-
can troops on March 26, 1945. Intelligence was received that the
1. For instance: LORD HANKEY, POLITIcs, TRIALS AND ERRORS, Oxford, 1950.
2. "It is not given to human beings, happily for them, for otherwise life would be intol-
erable, to foresee or predict to any large extent the unfolding course of events. In one phase
men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a few
years later, when the perspective of time has lengthened, all stands in a different setting."
CHURCHILL, THEIR FINEST HOUR, Boston, 1949, p. 550.
3. For a coverage of their general aspects, see: KOESSLER, American War Crimes Trials
in Europe, GEORGET0WN LAW JOURNAL. 18-112. 39 (1950).
4. WAR CRIMES TRIALS, VOL. IV: THE HADAMAR TRIAI, London, 1949, consisting mainly
of a verbatim print of the trial transcript.
5. Digested in: 1, LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London, 1947, pp. 46-54.
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local insane asylum, a "sanatorium" operated by the provincial govern-
ment, was one of the institutions in which euthanasia had been applied
to incurably insane persons during the war,6 and that, subsequent to
about June 5, 1944, more than 400 foreigners, Poles in part, and Rus-
sians, had been exterminated there on the alleged ground of being
affected with incurable tuberculosis. After investigation, seven of
those involved in the killings of foreigners were brought to account in
a trial before an American Military Commission. The text of the
accusation follows :7
CHARGE: VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
SPECIFICATION: In that Alfons Klein, Adolf Wahlmann, Heinrich Ruoff, Karl
Willig, Adolf Merkle, Irmgard Huber, and Philip Blum, acting jointly and in pur-
suance of a common intent and acting for and on behalf of the then German Reich,
did, from on or about 1 July, 1944, to on or about 1 April, 1945, at Hadamar,
Germany, willfully, deliberately and wrongfully, aid, abet and participate in the
killing of human beings of Polish and Russian nationality, their exact names and
number being unknown but aggregating in excess of 400, and who were then and
there confined by the then German Reich as an exercise of belligerent control.
Of the seven defendants, one, Adolf Klein, was the administrative
chief of the Hadamar Sanatorium, another one, Adolf Wahlmann, its
only doctor; Adolf Merkle was the institution's registrar; Heinrich
Ruoff was the chief male nurse and Karl Willig the assistant male
nurse; Irmgard Huber was the chief female nurse; Philip Blum acted
as the undertaker.
II. HITLER'S EUTHANASIA ORDER
In that part of its judgment which is entitled "Slave Labor Policy,"
the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg makes this historic
statement :8
Reference should also be made to the policy which was in existence in Germany
by the summer of 1940, under which old-aged, insane, and incurable people, "useless
eaters," were transferred to special institutions where they were killed, and their
relatives informed that they had died from natural causes. The victims were not
confined to German citizens, but included foreign laborers, who were no longer able
to work, and were therefore useless to the German war machine. It has been esti-
mated that at least some 275,000 people were killed in this manner in nursing homes,
hospitals, and asylums, which were under the jurisdiction of the defendant Frick, in
his capacity as Minister of the Interior. How many foreign workers were included
in this total it has been quite impossible to determine.
6. Not included in the charge in the war crimes trial, infra.
7. Op. cit. supra note 4, p. XXIII and op. cit. supra note 5, p. 47.
8. 1, TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
Nurnberg, 1947, p. 247. See also: ibid., p. 301.
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Much additional evidence on this so-called euthanasia policy is
discussed in the judgment in one of the twelve subsequent Nuremberg
trials, the so-called Medical Case, officially designated as United States
V. Karl Brandt et al. Three of the defendants therein, Karl Brandt,
Victor Brack and Waldemar Hoven, were found guilty on charges in-
cluding their connection with the euthanasia policy.9 One of them,
Brandt, who had been Hitler's personal physician, testified that he,
himself, was a sincere believer in the propriety of administering euthan-
asia to persons hopelessly ill, whose lives were burdensome to them-
selves, their families, the nation. It should be mentioned that a similar
proposition had, even prior to the nazi regime, been made in Germany
by the two learned authors of a pamphlet, consisting of a medical and
a legal part, published under the significant title: "Annihilation of
Useless Lives to Be Licensed."1 0 Such radical ideas were, of course,
bound to find-a favorable reception in Hitler's eccentric mind.
On September 1, 1939, the day of Germany's invasion of Poland, he
gave the green light to 'their transformation from armchair specula-
tions into grim reality. On that fateful date, he signed a secret order,
typed on his personal letterhead, reading in the Nuremberg translation
as follows :11
Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the responsibility of en-
larging the authority of certain physicians, to be designated by name, in such a man-
ner that persons who, according to human judgment, are incurable can, upon a most
careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded a mercy death.
It appears from this key directive that the euthanasia policy was
originally not colored with discrimination on racial or similar grounds,
but applicable to any person, irrespective of race or nationality. As a
matter of fact, at least in the beginning, Germans were the overwhelm-
ing majority of those exterminated under this program.' 2 To what
extent certain later phases of the action deviated from this initial
scheme, is not quite clear from the available material. For instance,
when in 1941, in the course of the so-called "action 14 F 13," physically
9. United States v. Karl Brandt et al., official trial transcript (mimeographed), pp.
11393-11395; 11442-11447; 11507, 11508; 11519. See also: 1, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BE-
FORE THE NURNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NR. 10, Washington,
1949, p. 794 et seq. and MITSCHERLICH AND Ivy, DocToRS OF INFAMY: THE STORY OF THE
NAZI MEDICAL CRIMES, New York, 1949, passim.
10. HoCHE AND BINDING, DIE FREIGABE DER VERNICHTUNG LEBENSUNWERTEN LEBENS,
Leipzig, 1920; critically discussed by: KOESSLER, SELBSTMORD UND TOETUNG AUF VERLANGEN
(Suicide and Mercy Killing), Vienna, 1925, pp. 27-29.
11. Quoted from: United States v. Karl Brandt et al., official trial transcript, p. 11393.
Bouhler, mentioned in this order along with Dr. Brandt, was a high ranking Nazi party
official and also the incumbent of an important position in the Ministry of the Interior that
had the administrative control of medical matters.
12. This is generally admitted.
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and mentally deficient prisoners of the Buchenwald concentration camp,
then in charge of Ilse Koch's husband, were sent to a euthanasia station
for extermination, this did not affect Jewish inmates alone, even
though Jews represented a considerable number of the victims. 13 There
are, however, certain indications that euthanasia was made to serve,
incidentally, the policy of exterminating "inferior" races. For instance,
on May 1, 1942, Greiser, Gauleiter (Party Chief) of a certain part
of occupied Poland,14 wrote a letter to Himmler wherein he asked for
permission to apply euthanasia to members of "the Polish race" in his
Gau, suffering from incurable tuberculosis.' 5
Bouhler and Brandt, charged by Hitler with the implementation of
his secret order, organized an elaborate administrative procedure for
the selection of those to be exterminated. Appropriate questionnaires
were distributed among those in charge of the various old age and
mental institutions, to be filled out in detail with regard to each inmate,
and to be returned to the Ministry of the Interior. Here, this material
was studied by special experts who endorsed their opinions as to the
incurable or curable character of the respective patients. Their opinions
were reviewed by a burocratic body on a higher level, authorized to
make the final determination. Those condemned as the result of this
procedure, were first brought to collection points and from there to
the various euthanasia stations, to be gassed to death. Throughout
the whole proceeding, shrewd methods were applied in a sincere attempt
to keep the victims unaware of the fate prepared for them; when they
were finally led to their death, the gas chambers were represented to
them-and camouflaged-as shower rooms. According to the ob-
viously self-serving, but apparently unrefuted testimony of the wire
pullers, the victims were given a death as painless as possible. A few
moments after the poisonous gas had been let into the chamber, they
became drowsy and finally lapsed into a deep sleep, without ever being
conscious of dying.
1 6
Obviously in anticipation of unfavorable public reaction, stirred up
by the victims' relatives, the whole proceeding was clouded in a dense
veil of secrecy. Those engaged in it, were required to sign a pledge
under oath not to divulge any information or clue. They were per-
13. United States v. Karl Brandt et al., official trial transcript, p. 11519 in connection
with pp. 11507, 11508.
14. Subsequently tried for a series of atrocities by the Supreme Court of Poland (June-
July, 1946) ; convicted, sentenced to death, executed. 13, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, London, 1949, pp. 70 et seq.
15. United States v. Karl Brandt et al., official trial transcript, p. 11442. Greiser's sug-
gestion was not accepted, at that time. Ibid., p. 11447.
16. Ibid., pp. 11393-11395, 11507, 11508.
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emptorily warned that any violation of this oath would result in most
serious consequences. The relatives of those selected for extermina-
tion were not given any opportunity to be heard before the final decision.
Nor were they truthfully informed of the accomplished fact. They
received short official notifications in terms of which their relatives had
died from natural causes.'
It was nevertheless not possible to prevent the truth from gradually
leaking through, especially in view of the great number of extermina-
tions, carried out at about the same time, and the suspicious manner in
which numerous people were suddenly notified of the alleged natural
decease of their relatives. Vigorous protests were issued by high-ranking
ecclesiastical personalities, including Cardinal Faulhaber, complaining
about the flagrant violation of fundamental principles of religion and
humanity. 19 Various public prosecutors' offices received information
of relatives of victims, requesting an investigation of the circumstances
surrounding the mysterious passing away of their beloved ones.20 Per-
haps as the only instance of this kind throughout his dictatorship,
Hitler finally yielded to the pressure of public opinion, though only to a
certain extent, as the subsequent revival of the euthanasia policy shows.
Upon his order, the policy was discontinued about August 1941. In
some of the euthanasia stations, including Hadamar, the special gas
chamber installations were dismantled. 2' To the time of this reversal
of the policy, about 10,000 persons had been gassed to death in Hada-
mar, which was only one of numerous euthanasia stations.
22
This was not the end, however. After a relatively short period of
inaction, the euthanasia policy was resumed, though on a smaller scale
and with the use of a new technique of killing-poisoning by the
alternative use of injections or medications. In Hadamar this phase
extended from about August 1942 to June 1944, and involved the
extermination of 3,000-3,500 mentally sick persons, most probably of
German nationality.
23
It thus appears that even prior to those occurrences which were the
subject-matter of the charges in the Hadamar Trial, this "sanatorium"
had, in Mr. Justice Jackson's words, "drifted from a hospital to a
17. Ibid., pp. 11393-111395.
18. See; quotation from the judgment of the IMT, supra.
19. ROTHFELs, GERMAN OPPosrION TO HITLER. Hinsdale, 1948, p. 32; MITSCHERLICH AND
Ivy, DocTORs OF INFAMY, New York, 1949, pp. 106 et seq.
20. Op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 133, 134.
21. MITSCHERLICH AND Ivy, DOCTORS OF INFAMY, New York, 1949, pp. 113, 114.
22. Op. cit. supra note 4, p. 87.
23. Ibid., pp. 70, 75, 88.
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human slaughter-house. ' ' 24 The personnel engaged in the poisoning
to death of incurably insane Germans, could easily adjust themselves
to their new assignment-the poisoning to death of foreigners, alleged
to be affected with incurable tuberculosis.
III. EUTHANASIA APPLIED TO "EASTERN WORKERS"
It was proven in the trial beyond any doubt, that between about June
1944 and March 1945, upon arrangement by the German Labor Office,
several transports of sick foreigners, Poles and Russians, men, women
and a few children, altogether about 476, were channelled to the Hada-
mar sanatorium, where one or two days after the arrival of such a
transport, all the patients belonging to it were killed either by hypo-
dermic injections of morphine or scopolamine, or of derivatives thereof,
or by pills containing sufficient doses of veronal or chloral. Euthanasia
should convey the idea of a beautiful death. It is hard to believe
that those who, with the cool routine of experts, administered to the
patients the above described treatment, should not have seen the in-
consistency of their practice with sincere euthanasia. Some of the eye
witnesses gave descriptions of details not less gruesome than dramatic. 25
It could not be refuted, however, that the victims were unaware of
their destiny. The injections or medications seem to have been applied
under the alternative pretexts of being a cure applied to heal the
patient or an inoculation necessary for protection against communicable
diseases.
All those foreigners, condemned to euthanasia, were supposed to
have been medically examined and diagnosed as suffering from incur-
able tuberculosis, before they were sent to Hadamar. The prosecution
attempted to prove that this diagnosis may not have been correct at
least in certain cases.2 6 It seems that similar doubts were occasionally
entertained and even expressed by the institution's physician, the de-
fendant, Dr. Wahlmann.2 v
The bodies of the victims were buried in mass graves in the institu-
tion's own cemetery, the defendant Blum being in charge of this part
of the routine.28
Efforts were made to camouflage the homicides as natural deaths.
Upon their arrival at the institution, the patients were registered. At
24. Ibid., p. XIV (Foreword by Mr. Justice Jackson).
25. Ibid., pp. 17 et seq.; 45 ef seq.; 41 et seq.; 174 et seq.
26. Ibid., p. XXV and pp. 59-61.
27. Ibid. pp. 172, 173; 185.
28. Ibid., pp. 145 et seq.
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this point, their personal data, name, sex, age, nationality, were truth-
fully recorded. However, certificates concerning causes of death con-
tained fictitious entries. Usually, pneumonia was indicated. Also, the
certified dates of decease were not correct, obviously to cover up the
fact that so many patients died on the same day and almost im-
mediately upon their arrival at the institution. This part of the team
work was the particular responsibility of the defendant Merkle.
2 9
The more than 400 foreigners, Poles and Russians, to whom euthan-
asia was administered in Hadamar in the period covered by the charge-
sheet, had obviously been employed at labor in Germany, before becoming
unfit to work because of sickness. This appears sufficiently from the fact
that they were sent to Hadamar by the Labor Office. The theory of the
prosecution concerning their status went further than this. It was
claimed that they had been members of civilian populations of terri-
tories belligerently occupied by the German Reich and that they had
been conscripted for work in Germany by the forces of occupation."
No evidence to prove this allegation was introduced in the trial. It
has been suggested subsequent to the trial that the Commission "was
dearly entitled as a matter of judicial knowledge to find this fact to be
true."3 1 While the technical correctness of the proposition would seem
to be questionable, it is highly probable that those Poles and Russians
really belonged to that category of foreign labor in Germany which is
referred to as "slave labor" in the judgment of the International Mil-
itary Tribunal in Nuremberg.8
There is abundant evidence to the effect that ruthless exploitation
was the keynote of the treatment of foreign workers employed in
Germany, 8 and particularly of Poles and Russians, officially discrimin-
ated against as "Eastern workers." 34 The last mentioned group got
the worst in every respect: food, housing, medical treatment, punish-
ment. Those responsible for their miserable conditions of life were not
influenced by any sentimental feelings. It is, therefore, hardly believable
29. Ibid., pp. 25 et seq.
30. Intimated by the following passage in the charge sheet, quoted in I, supra.: "who
were then and there confined by the then German Reich as an exercise of belligerent
control."
31. Op. cit. supra note 4, p. XXIII (Kintner, editor). Cf.: KOESSLER, Op. cit. supra note
3, pp. 79, 80. *
32. 1. TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
Nurnberg, 1947, pp. 243 et seq.
33. THE EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOR BY GERMANY (International Labor Office
publication), Montreal, 1945; 7, LAW REPORTIS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London, 1948,
pp. 4547; 10, ibid. 1949, pp. 141-145; 15, ibid. 1949, pp. 117-121.
34. 10, LAw RFORTs OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London, 1949, pp. 96-98 to be com-
pared with pp. 99, 100.
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that pity should have been the dominant motive for the application of
euthanasia in these cases. Nevertheless, one of the defendants pretended
that the action had been dictated by sympathy with the helpless physical
condition of the patients and the desire to preserve their camp fellows
from the danger of contagion.35 It is more plausible that the desire
to abate the nuisance of an unproductive burden, rather than any
humanitarian idea, was instrumental in the application of euthanasia
to Eastern workers who had become physically unfit for work. After
all, this was the leading idea of Hitler's euthanasia policy even in its
application to Germans.
3 6
IV. PARTICIPATION OF THE SEVERAL DEFENDANTS
Conspiracy, technically, is a peculiar Anglo-American legal conception,
and its applicability in a trial under international law seems to be highly
doubtful 3 7 It was not this conception, however, but the more gen-
eral one of a common design which was applied in certain non-Nuremberg
war crimes trials, including the Hadamar case. The basic idea was that
whoever joins in a scheme to commit an unlawful act, is responsible
for the natural or probable consequences of that criminal design, even
though he remains at a distance from the final phase of its execution.
While in conspiracy, the agreement for an unlawful purpose is the core
of the offense, the common design charge looks to the substantive
offense in which a person may criminally participate by becoming a party
to a scheme tending toward its perpetration. In a common design
charge, the agreement is considered circumstantial evidence of partici-
pation in the crime, but not the crime itself. Such a doctrine appears to
remain within the ambit of principles of criminal guilt, generally rec-
ognized by all civilized systems of lawY8 It is in this light that we must
look at the charge in the Hadamar trial, that the defendants "acting
jointly and in pursuance of a common intent . . . . did . . . .wilfully,
deliberately and wrongfully, aid, abet and participate in the killing of
human beings....,
In its opening argument, the prosecution declared the Hadamar
35. Op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 199, 200.
36. II, supra.
37. Cf., however, KEENAN AND BROWN, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW, Washing-
ton, 1945, pp. 88 et seq.
38. KOESSLER, op cit. supra note 3 p. 82; 15, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
London, 1949, pp. 90, 94. A similar proposition seems to underly the opinion of the Presi-
dent of the International Military Tribunal in the Far East, quoted by HORWITZ, THE





institution to have been a "murder factory" where "there was operated
a production line of death." It was claimed that any person who partici-
pated in that operation, "no matter to what extent," was guilty of the
crime charged.40 The following was quoted from Wharton's Criminal
law: "No matter how wide may be the separation of the confederates,
if they are all engaged in a cominon plan for the execution of a felony,
and all take part in furtherance of the common design, all are liable
as principals." 4 1 It was argued also "that this crime, as many others,
is in a chain of events, that there were several links in the chain that
produced the ultimate offense, and that each of the accused formed a
link in that chain in his or her respective capacity." 42
Of the seven defendants, only two had their hands directly in the
killing of the victims, namely the two male nurses, Ruoff and Willig.
Both admitted their active participation in the administering of the
poisonous injections or medications.43 Ruoff was anxious to emphasize
that medications in the form of tablets dispensed to the patients were
the method normally applied, while injections were resorted to only
under exceptional circumstances. 44 Their admissions were corroborated
by eyewitnesses, called by the prosecution.
45
The female nurse, defendant Huber, was responsible for the drugs
in the dispensary, and in that capacity she issued morphine and scopola-
mine to be used and actually employed in the euthanasia action. She
denied this charge, but there was sufficient evidence to prove its cor-
rectness.
46
Defendant Klein admitted, though only on cross-examination, to
have relayed to his subordinates the order to apply euthanasia to the
foreigners involved. He claimed to have received this order from
the provincial Nazi party chief or "Gauleiter" with the advice that
they fell under the same law under which insane Germans had before
been similarly exterminated in the institution.4 7 It was obvious from
overwhelming evidence that he was the top man in the institution and
that nothing of any importance could have happened therein without his
direction or at least consent. He attempted, however, to reduce his
degree of guilt by claiming that this was a medical affair for which not
40. Op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 203, 204.
41. Ibid., pp. 205, 206, referring to WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, Volume 1, p. 256.
42. Op. cit. supra note 4, p. 206.
43. Ibid., pp. 75-77, 81, 82, 174 et seq., 181 et seq.
44. Ibid., pp. 175, 176.
45. Ibid., pp. 19, 20, 42, 43.
46. Ibid., pp. 27, 28.
47. Ibid., p. 106.
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he as the chief of the institution's administration, but the defendant
Wahlmann, as its doctor, was mainly responsible.
The latter, in turn, emphasized his position as a subordinate of Klein,
but admitted his knowledge of the order to administer euthanasia to
the Poles and Russians, and his participation as the top medical man
in the carrying out of the scheme, in which the nurses obviously acted
according to his instructionsA
While the criminal connection of the above-mentioned five defendants
with the charge was not difficult, rather a matter of course, the tying
in of the defendants Blum and Merkle was less obvious. Blum, Klein's
cousin and fully aware of what was going on, buried the bodies in mass
graves in the institution's cemetery. According to the prosecution, he
was an essential link in the common design and its execution, "one cog
in the machinery of death.' 4 9 Merkle disclaimed any contemporaneous
knowledge of the euthanasia killings, and rather brazenly pleaded that
he had never entertained any doubt in the natural decease of those
patients. He energetically denied having intentionally or consciously
made false entries in the respective death certificates. However, his
role as the main actor in the last mentioned part of the scheme, was
proven by the testimony of his former clerical assistant."' He appears
also strongly implicated by statements of co-defendants. In a post-
trial appraisal it is said that "he had been a faithful and necessary tool
to the murders and their concealment. ' 51 According to the prosecu-
tion's argument, his work was "a part and parcel of this scheme to
cover up the killings at this institution" and
"an important part and parcel of it, because . . one of the features of the illegal
enterprise was to make it appear as though these poor people arrived there almost at
death's doorstep as far as their physical condition was concerned, and that they
lingered and suffered there for a few days, in some instances for a few weeks, and
finally met their death from the ravages of the disease." 52
It is submitted that the criminal guilt of the defendants Blum and
Merkle was close to if not beyond the borderline which separates the
participation as a principal from that of an accessory after the fact.
The severe sentences meted out to each of them, 58 do not seem to square
with this proposition.
48. Ibid., pp. 162 et seq.
49. Ibid., p. 219.
50. Ibid., pp. 25 et seq.
51. Ibid., p. XXXIII (Kintner, editor).




V. TRIAL AND JUDGMENT
The case was tried in Wiesbaden, Germany, October 8-15, 1945,
before an American Military Commission, consisting of six field grade
officers (five Colonels, one Lieutenant Colonel), assigned to this special
duty by the Commanding General of the Seventh United States Army.
The appointing order provided :s
The Commission shall have power, as required, to make such rules for the
conduct of its proceedings, consistent with the powers of such commission, as
deemed necessary for a full and fair trial of the accused. The Commission shall
have regard for, but shall not be bound by, rules of procedure and evidence pre-
scribed for general courts martial. Such evidence shall be admitted as has, in the
opinion of the President of the Commission, probative value to a reasonable man.
Peremptory challenges shall not be allowed. The concurrence of at least two-thirds
of the members present at the time of voting shall be necessary for a conviction
or sentence.
There is a striking similarity between these terms-with those set
forth in the order dated July 7, 1942 whereby President Franklin D.
Roosevelt appointed a Military Commission to try Ernest Peter Burger
and seven others, including Hans Haupt and Richard Quirin (so-called
Saboteurs case).ss
The trial transcript of the Hadamar case, published verbatim,56 would
seem to demonstrate that the special rules of procedure and evidence,
applied by the Commission,57 did not deprive the defendants of a fair
trial in an international sense of this phrase.
58
The prosecution, in charge of an American lawyer who happened to
be a Reserve Colonel in the Judge Advocate's Department, pressed the
case against the defendants very energetically, even where doubtful legal
points were involved, but remained strictly within the bounds of pro-
fessional propriety.59
In asserting the jurisdiction of the Military Commission in spite
54. 1, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London, 1947, p. 46.
55. FEDERAL REGISTER, July 7, 1942, Nos. 5101, 5103. Ex parte Quirin (1942) 317 U. S. 1
does not discuss the terms of reference of the Commission.
56. Note 4, supra.
57. For a general discussion, see: KOESSLER, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 54,55, 69-76, 77, 105.
The Regulation on Military Commissions of Headquarters, U. S. Forces, European Theater,
is printed ibid., pp. 106-109. On the distinctive features of Military Commissions, see
ibid., pp. 41-44. Leading cases: Ex parte Quirin (1942) 317 U. S. 1 and In re Yamashita
(1946) 327 U. S. 1. See also: GREEN, The Military Commission, 42 (1948) AM. J. I. L.,
832.
58. WRIGHT, Due Process and International Law, 40 (1946) AM. J. I. L., 398; SC-WARZEN-
BERGER, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS, London,
1950, pp. 263 et seq. at 269, 270; HORWiTZ, The Tokyo Trial, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION,
November, 1950, p. 565.
59. The applicable standard is defined by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Berger v. United States 295 U. S. 78, 88, quoted with approval in Viereck v. United States
(1942) 318 U. S. 236.
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of the absence of any American victim, reference was made to the
principle of universality of war crimes jurisdiction, as announced in
a learned paper, 60 the conclusion of which has become the generally
accepted view. In substance according to this theory, the vindication
of international law is a concern of any government, and an offender
against international law may therefore be tried by any government
which has physical control of him, irrespective of any direct national
interest involved.
It is perhaps not quite consistent with the highest ideals of criminal
justice that part of those involved in the euthanasia practice, charged
by the prosecution, did not appear in the dock but as witnesses for the
prosecution."- However, this shortcoming occurs "in the best fam-
ilies," as it were. It occurs without any unfavorable public reaction
in sensational trials in the United States. As a pragmatic necessity
it seems to be unavoidable where otherwise the case against the per-
petrators of most shocking crimes could not be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Moreover, such a policy of the prosecution, even if it
should be reprehensible, has obviously nothing to do with the fairness
of the trial which may nevertheless come up to the highest judicial
standard.
The defense was in the hands of two American lawyers, officially
assigned by the Army, one of them with the military rank of Lieutenant
Colonel in the Reserve, and of four German attorneys at law, chosen
by their clients themselves. This defense team made conscientious
efforts to adduce whatever evidence in favor of the defendants was
within the realm of practical possibility, and the Commission gave them
full co-operation. The atmosphere of the trial, as it appears from the
transcript, was a judicial one, free from any element of oppression.
Each defendant was allowed, by the Commission, to choose between
testifying in his own behalf or refusing to testify, and in the first case, to
choose between testifying under oath or making an unsworn statement.
62
It was contrary to the continental practice, but in accordance with the
general American one, that the prosecution had the benefit of the
closing argument.
The defense challenged the jurisdiction of the Commission. But
it seems not to have raised the particular point that the status of the
victims as members of civilian populations of countries belligerently
60. COWLES, Uni'versality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 (194-5) CALIF. L. REV. 177.
See also: KOESSLER, op. ciu. supra note 3, pp. 37 et seq.
61. Op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 34 and 204.
62. On the respective general practice, see: KOESSLER, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 64-66.
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occupied by Germany, was taken for granted by the prosecution without
effort to prove this proposition by evidence tending to support it. 68
Two particular pleas will be discussed hereinafter.64
All seven defendants were found guilty. Three (Klein, Ruoff and
Willig) were sentenced to death; one (Wahlmann), to imprisonment
for life; one (Merkle), was sentenced to imprisonment for 35 years;
one (Blum), for 30 years, and one (Huber) for 25 years.
In retrospect it would seem that these sentences were too severe
in view of the fact that the defendants had committed the acts, charged
as crimes against international law, in their own country and in reliance
upon their immunity under the regime prevailing then and there,65 and
also in consideration of the enormous pressure inherent in the system
of government represented by Hitler's Third Reich. 66 It would seem
that no credit was given, by the Commission, to the mitigating effect
of these extraordinary circumstances. The tribunal was obviously
more influenced by the great number of innocent persons actually killed
by the instrumentality of the defendants. Two of the death sentences
were meted out to the defendants (Ruoff and Willig) who had been
directly engaged in the administering of the euthanasia to the persons
involved as victims. The third death sentence was given to the defend-
ant (Klein) who had been the head of the institution while it degen-
erated from an insane asylum into an operation murder.6 7 Wahlmann,
who was seventy years old at the time of the trial, was not sentenced
to death, perhaps because of his age, or because of a certain disagree-
ment with the action in which he, nevertheless, participated. 6 It was
also obvious that Klein definitely overshadowed him in responsibility
for the action of those defendants who were in subordinate positions.
The only female defendant (Huber) was probably, therefore, given a
more lenient treatment than any of the other defendants, because
there was credible character evidence in her favor,69 and because her
attitude during the trial was that of apparently sincere repentance.
It would seem that the stiff sentences meted out to the defendants
Merkle and Blum were not commensurate to their secondary, though
most ugly roles in the criminal undertaking.
63. III, supra.
64. VI and VII, infra.
65. VI, infra.
66. VII, infra.
67. Shortly before the American occupation of Hadamar, he had asked the Labor Office
to stop sending tuberculosis patients to Hadamar "because of lack of space" there. This
letter, dated March 6, 1945, is printed in op. cit. supra note 4, p. 33.
68. His letter, dated November 28, 1944, in op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 172, 173.
69. Op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 158 et seq.
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In accordance with the usual procedure in the non-Nuremberg trials,
the judgment was not accompanied by a reasoned opinion, but consisted
merely in the finding of guilty and the announcement of the sentehces. 70
However, likewise in accordance with established routine, the whole
record was submitted for review to two levels of command: with
regard to all the defendants to the Commanding General of the Seventh
Army as the appointing officer, and regarding those sentenced to death,
it was submitted, also, to the European Theater Commander. 71 As a
result of this double review, all the findings were approved and the
sentences, including the capital ones, confirmed and executed.
It is to the credit of the American sense of justice that a clemency
action in grand style has recently been carried out with regard to certain
war crimes inmates of the Landsberg prison.72 Whether any of the
persons convicted and sentenced in the Hadamar trial is among those
benefited by this action, or has prior to it received an executive pardon,
is beyond the writer's information.
VI. THE PLEA OF IMMUNITY UNDER HITLER'S LAW
Through the testimonies of all defendants, save one, it runs like
a red thread that at the time when euthanasia was applied to the Poles
and Russians suffering from incurable tuberculosis, those working in
the institution were officially advised and honestly believed that to
this new group of patients the same law was applicable under which
theretofore insane Germans had received a similar treatment. Klein
and Wahlmann had been informed so by the chief of the provincial
government administration and by the provincial Nazi party chief
when they received from them the order pursuant to which the action
was started. 7 The other defendants, directly or indirectly, learned
it from Klein and Wahlmann. Only Merkle could not use this plea
since he claimed that at the time involved in the charge, he had never
had any doubt in the natural death of the victims, entered as cause of
death in the certificates concerning their decease. He adamantly
denied any fictitious character of those entries.
Hitler's order, dated September 1, 1939, quoted above,74 introduced
in evidence in the Nuremberg Medical case, was not precisely known
70. KOESSLER, Op. cit. supra note 3, p. 29.
71. On the respective general procedure, see: ibid. pp. 67-69.
72. LANDSBERG: A DOCUMENTARY REPORT, Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for
Germany (Department of State), 1951.
73. Neither of these superiors of the defendants was alive at the time when the investi-
gation of the Hadamar atrocities began, one of them having committed suicide.
74. II and footnote 11, supra.
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and only vaguely proven in the earlier Hadamar trial. The only per-
tinent evidence which defense counsel were able to present, was the
testimony of a highly credible witness, the former chief prosecutor of
Wiesbaden. His statements were based on hearsay, namely on informa-
tion he had received from his then superior, the chief prosecutor of
Frankfurt. The latter, as he related to the witness, participated at
an official meeting of top justice officials who were called for this pur-
pose to the Ministry of Justice in Berlin. On this occasion they were
shown a secret order by Hitler, authorizing the application of euthan-
asia to incurably insane persons. 75 This order was construed by the
prosecution, and probably believed by the Commission, to have covered
only the application of euthanasia to incurably insane Germans, not to
foreigners, and not to persons suffering from incurable tuberculosis.
76
We have now, from the document produced in the later Medical
Case in Nuremberg, the hindsight knowledge that Hitler's euthanasia
order contained no such limitation. The question therefore arises
whether proof of the real contents of Hitler's order would have given
a different legal aspect to the incriminated action of the defendants.
For the purpose of this inquiry, we shall consider separately the legal
effect of Hitler's order under German law, on the one hand, and inter-
national law on the other hand.
(a) UNDER GERMAN LAW
In view of the notorious nature of Hitler's dictatorship, especially
as exercised during the war, it would be highly unrealistic to distinguish,
in so far as German law was concerned, between the effect of a law
officially published as such and a secret order by Hitler. His will was,
under Nazi ideology and the then prevailing official government theory,
the supreme law of the land. From the top to the bottom of the
hierarchy of the Third Reich, nobody was able to challenge the propo-
sition that Hider's whim and will could legalize and immunize what
otherwise would be criminal homicide.
It follows that, under the German law, as in force under the Third
Reich, the defendants could not be held criminally responsible for the
killing of either Germans or foreigners, if their action was covered by
Hitler's order.
However, the Military Commission in the Hadamar trial was not
supposed to apply Nazi law but international law, and under inter-
75. Op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 13-137.
76. Ibid., p. XXIV (Introduction).
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national law, the legal situation is completely different, as will be
discussed presently.
(b) UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The International Military Tribunal which decided the so-called
RUSHA case in Nuremberg, expressed the view "that euthanasia, when
carried out under state legislation against citizens of the state only,
does not constitute a crime against humanity."77 It is not necessary,
for the present purpose, to examine the soundness of this proposition,
since the novel theory of crimes against humanity was not applied in
the "non-Nuremberg" trials, conducted by the U. S. Army in Ger-
many,"' and since the charge in the Hadamar case, though generally
phrased as "Violation of International Law,"' 79 was obviously intended
and understood as the charge of a war crime. This appears from its
specification. It is also inherent in the nature of a Military Commission 0
that its jurisdiction extends only to war crimes.
It seems to be fundamental that no state has the right to deprive a
foreigner of his life on any other ground than upon conviction under
due process of law of a crime subject to capital punishment. This is
particularly so in the case of foreigners who are subject to the state's
territorial jurisdiction in consequence of its belligerent occupation of
their home country.81 The ill-treatment of inhabitants of occupied
countries is recognized as a war crime.82 It does not seem to make any
difference, in this respect, whether such ill-treatment takes place in the
occupied territory itself, or in the zone of the interior of the occupant.88
The prosecution in the Hadamar trial claimed that the Poles and
Russians involved as victims were foreigners put to work in Germany in
77. United States v. Ulrich Greif et al., official trial transcript (mimeographed), pp.
5397, 5398. The problem involved in Mr. Justice Holmes famous opinion in Buck v. Bell
(1927) 274 U. S. 200, namely of sterilization, was of course a completely different one,
and was, moreover, covered there as a matter of American constitutional law and not of
international law.
78. KOESSLER, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 31, 77, 79, 80.
79. I and footnote 7, supra.
80. KOESSLER, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 41t et seq. and authorities cited there, including
Ex parte Quirin (1942) 317 U.S.1; In re Yamashita (1946) 327 U.S.l. See also: GREEN,
The Military Commission, 42 (1948) Am.J. INT.L. 832.
81. The prosecution in the Hadamar trial quoted article 46 of the Regulations attached
to the Hague Convention Nr. IV of 1907, providing as part of the duties of a belligerent
occupant: "Family honor and rights, individual life, and private property, as well as
religious convictions and worship, must be respected." Op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 6, 7.
82. 15, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London, 1949, p. 114.
83. Ibid., p. 85 (editorially): "On a narrow interpretation, the Hague Convention does
not protect civilians outside of occupied territory since the heading of Section II of the
Hague Convention is 'Military authority over the territory of the Hostile State,' but this
has not in fact prevented courts from extending the protection of the laws and usages of




consequence of the belligerent occupation of their home countries by
German armed forces.8 4  This proposition was not challenged by the
defense which contested the jurisdiction of the Commission on other,
more general grounds.8 5
If those Poles and Russians had this particular status, claimed by
the prosecution, and most probably assumed by the Military Com-
mission, 6 it can hardly be doubted that their extermination because of
their affliction with incurable tuberculosis constituted not only a flagrant
violation of international law in general, but a war crime.
The law of nations, by its very nature, overrides any inconsistent dom-
estic law. In one of the so called sebsequent Nuremberg judgments
it is said :8'
As to the punishment of persons guilty of violating the laws and customs of
war (war crimes in the narrow sense), it has always been recognized that tri-
bunals may be established and punishment imposed by the State into whose hands
the perpetrators fall. Those rules of international law were recognized as para-
mount, and jurisdiction to enforce them by the injured belligerent government,
whether within the territorial boundaries of the State or in occupied territory,
has been unquestioned.
Hider's euthanasia order, therefore, under international law, could
not immunize the action of the defendants. It could not divest it of its
otherwise exisiting character of war crime. In the above-quoted Nurem-
berg judgment, it is also said :8
The very essence of the prosecution case is that the laws, the Hitler decrees and
the draconic, corrupt, and perverted Nazi judicial system themselves constituted
the substance of war crimes and crimes against humanity and that participation in
the enactment and enforcement of them amounts to complicity in crime.
Nor would it, under international law, have availed the defendants
to claim that what they did, pursuant to Hitler's euthanasia order, was
to execute an act of state for. which only their government as such could
be held accountable. This act of state theory has been completely dis-
credited, and the criminal responsibility of individuals under inter-
national law is well established.89
84. III and footnotes 30-32, supra.
85. KoEssLER, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 79, 80 stating: "It was a technical defect rather
than going to substantial justice that the requirement of proof of this particular status
of the civilian victims involved was not sufficiently complied with in those trials."
86. Op. cit. supra note 4, p. XXIII, quoted at III, footnote 31, supra.
87. So-called Jusrica CASE (United States v. Josef Altstoetter et al.), 15 LAW REPORTS
or TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London, 1949, p. 23.
88. 6, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London, 1948, p. 49. This proposi-
tion would seem to be of general import even though it was, in that particular judgment,
applied to a system of justice thus characterized by the tribunal: "The dagger of the
assassin was concealed behind the robe of the jurist." Ibid., p. 50.
89. 1, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL, Nurnberg, 1947, 220, 221; JEssUp, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS, 15. The con-
trary view, expressed, for instance, by MANNER, The Legal Nature and Punishment of
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A bona fide belief of the defendants that they acted legitimately under
German law, at the time concerned, could therefore not have absolved
them from the charge of a crime under international law, more spe-
cifically, of a war crime. Nevertheless it is submitted that the Military
Commission would have been justified in considering this mental ap-
proach of the perpetrators as a mitigating circumstance. The Commis-
sion seems to have taken a different position, as apparently revealed by
the sentences meted out. 90
VII. THE PLEA OF NECESSITY
The theory of the plea of necessity,91 broadly stated, is that criminal
law cannot require an attitude which is practically impossible because it
is inconsistent with human nature. If it were required, then, under cer-
tain conditions, a justifying privilege may arise from an emergency
situation in which serious harm for the person involved can be avoided
only by his infliction of a serious harm upon another person. In a lead-
ing textbook92 it is said:
Necessity is a defence when it is shown that the act charged was done to avoid
an evil both serious and irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of
escape; and that the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil.
The particular problem as to whether necessity may ever serve as a
justification for otherwise criminal homicide was raised in two classical
cases involving shipwrecked persons who killed their companions in the
emergency to promote their own chances of survival. In each one of
these two cases, the ruling of the court was not squarely based on prin-
ciple, but on attending specific circumstances.9 There seems to be
some American authority to the effect that the homicidal taking of an
innocent life may be justified when the perpetrator, in an emergency, has
to choose between the preservation of the victim's life or of his own.
94
Section 52 of the German Criminal Code, in effect at the time of the
euthanasia killings in Hadamar, provided :95
An offense is not punishable if the offender was compelled to do it by irresistible
Criminal Acts of Violence Contrary to the Laws of War, 37 (1943) 37 Am. J. INT. L.
407, 408, would seem to have become obsolete.
90. V, supra.
91. The corresponding German term is "Notstand."
92. 1, WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed.), p. 177.
93. Reg. v. Dudley (1884) 15 Cox C.C. 624, 14 Q.B.D. 273; U.S. v. Holmes (1842)
26 Fed. Cas. 360 No. 15, 383 (C.C.E.D.,Pa.).
94. WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 92.
95. Quoted from the translation in: THE STATUTORY CRIMINAL LAW OF GERMANY,




force or under threat to himself or a relative, coupled with imminent danger
to life or limb which could not otherwise be averted.
The plea of necessity is of course different from the plea of self-
defense. "Self-defense excuses the repulse of a wrong whereas the rule
of necessity justifies the invasion of a right." 96 The plea of self-defense
attempts to justify an otherwise criminal act as apparently necessary to
protect the perpetrator against an actual or reasonably believed at-
tack; the plea of necessity purports to excuse an admitted attack upon
an innocent person. 9
7
The plea of superior order, though frequently raised concurrently
with the plea of necessity, is also different from the latter with which it
is sometimes confused. The plea of superior order emphasizes the
overriding effect of a duty to obey an order, incumbent upon a soldier
or a person with a similar special status; the plea of necessity, if raised
in a situation where the perpetrator acted pursuant to a superior order,
considers his duty to obey only insofar as the risk involved in failure
to obey is concerned.98
The plea of necessity was elaborately discussed in some of the sub-
sequent Nuremberg trials. In the so-called Flick case, one of the "In-
dustrial Cases," several defendants were acquitted from the charge of
slave labor on the ground that they had acted in a situation of necessity.99
A very lucid elaboration of the theory of necessity in criminal law and
its applicability in war crimes trials is contained in the judgment in the
Krupp case where the tribunal, however, denied that this plea was
available to the defendants in the light of the evidence. °10 Finally, in
the so-called Hostages case, the judgment announced :101
But it is stated that in military law even if the subordinate realizes that the act
he is called upon to perform is a crime, he may not refuse its execution without
incurring serious consequences, and that this, therefore, constitutes duress. Let it
be said at once that there is no law which requires that an innocent man must for-
96. Judgment in the Krupp Trial (United States v. Alfried Krupp et al.), 10, LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London, 1949, p. 148.
97. KOESSLER, Op. cit. supra note 3, p. 93.
98. Ibid.
99. It was said in the pertinent part of the judgment:
"This Tribunal might be reproached for wreaking vengeance rather than adminis-
tering justice if it were to declare as unavailable to defendants the defense of
necessity here urged in their behalf. This principle has had wide acceptance in
American and English courts and is recognized elsewhere."
9, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London. , p. 19.
100. 10, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, London, 1949, pp. 146 et seq.
101. United States v. Wilhelm List et al., 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
London, 1949, p. 91. For a general analysis of the plea, as discussed in various Nurem-




feit his life or suffer serious harm in order to avoid committing a crime which he
condemns. The threat, however, must be imminent, real and inevitable. No court
will punish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his head, is compelled to pull a
lethal lever. Nor need the peril be that imminent in order to escape punishment.
In the "non-Nuremberg" war crimes trials, the plea of necessity was
not always recognized as something different from the plea of superior
order. In the Hadamar trial the defendants raised in substance the
plea of necessity when they claimed that their participation in the
euthanasia action, charged as criminal, had been forced upon them
by orders from superior sides, and that under the general conditions
in the Third Reich and especially during the war, any attempt to
withdraw from the job would have been construed as sabotage and
would have exposed those attempting to resign to serious danger,
perhaps capital punishment, but at least internment in a concentration
camp. 102 From the fact that all of the defendants were found guilty, it
appears that the Commission was not impressed by this line of defense.
Whether the allegations made in support of the plea were disbelieved, as
a matter of fact, or whether the Commission was persuaded by the argu-
ment of the prosecution, discrediting the plea as a matter of law, can-
not be established from the record since, as mentioned hereinbefore, no
reasoned opinion accompanies the findings. 10 3 Upon a realistic appraisal
of the situation prevailing under Hitler's dictatorship in Germany,
especially during the war, it would seem obvious that the defendants
might have made themselves suspicious and exposed themselves to serious
harm should they have shown any lack of full co-operation with the policy
of those in power, to avoid their personal participation in the atrocities
involved. The record shows, however, a complete failure of proof that
by an attempt of resignation, either granted or denied, they would have
jeopardized their lives and thus exposed themselves to the danger of an
evil commensurate to the one inflicted upon the victims of the action
charged as criminal. Nor is there evidence or even a mere showing to
the effect that such a withdrawal from the job was attempted by any of
them. While under these circumstances, an absolute effect of the plea
of necessity was rightly denied, by implication, the question would seem
to be arguable whether the Commission should not have considered the
factual situation, urged in support of the plea, as a mitigating circum-
stance.'
0 4
102. Op. cit. supra note 4, Introduction, pp. XXX-XXXIII and numerous pages in tran-
script, covering the pleas of the individual defendants.
103. In accordance with the general practice in the "non-Nuremberg" trials.
104. It is also arguable, however, that no mitigation was proper in view of the great




The attempt has been made to submit an unbiased historical and legal
profile of the Hadamar Trial. There are points, it has been shown,
where the result reached in that case may be vulnerable in the light of
hindsight knowledge of the facts involved and the present day approach
to the problem of war crimes trials. There may be disagreement, in
certain legal quarters, with some of the convictions and with the severity
of the sentences. Nobody, however, who intelligently reads the trial
transcript, can ignore the fact that if errors were made in the adjudica-
tion of this case, they were made by a tribunal whose members honestly
strived at the achievement of justice.
